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Abstract 
This article aims to shed new light on Germany’s domineering role in the eurocrisis. I argue that the realist-
inspired depiction of Germany as a ‘geo-economic power’, locked into zero-sum competition with its 
European partners, is built around an empty core: unable to theorise how anarchy shapes the calculus of states 
where security competition has receded, it cannot explain why German state managers have insisted on an 
austerity response to the crisis despite its significant risks and costs even for Germany itself. To unlock this 
puzzle, this article outlines a version of uneven and combined development (UCD) that is better able to capture 
the international pressures and opportunities faced by policy elites in advanced capitalist states that no longer 
encounter one another as direct security rivals. Applied to Germany, this lens reveals a twofold unevenness 
in the historical structures and growth cycles of capitalist economies that shape its contradictory choice for 
austerity. In the long run, the reorientation of the export-dependent German economy from Europe towards 
Asian and Latin American late industrialisers renders the structural adjustment of the eurozone an 
opportunity—from the cost-saving view of German manufacturers producing in the European home market 
for export abroad, as well as for German state officials keen to sustain a crumbling class compromise centred 
on Germany’s world market success. In the short term, however, its exposed position between the divergent 
post-crisis trajectories of the US and Europe accelerates pressures for austerity beyond what German state and 
corporate elites would otherwise consider feasible. 
 
 
                                                 
1 This article was written as part of a joint research project on ‘The Current Conjuncture in World Affairs’ 
which was jointly funded by the University of Sussex and the Polson Institute for Global Development at 
Cornell University. 
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Since the onset of the global financial crisis, the liberal project of an ‘ever closer’ European 
Union (EU) has been thrown into fundamental disarray: by a protracted slump that has 
engulfed the Southern periphery of Europe, and by the assertion of German primacy at its 
Northern core. To many observers these two processes are intimately connected. German 
policy makers more than anyone else have blocked a range of solidaristic solutions to 
Europe’s public debt crisis (Cesaratti, 2013: 249; Cafruny, 2015: 66-67)2; they have steadfastly 
resisted calls to reflate their domestic economy and rein in their trade surplus (Pettis, 2013; 
Beck, 2015); and they have most vigorously tied financial support for Southern deficit 
countries to a programme of budget cuts, structural reforms and privatisation schemes that 
many argue has pushed the targeted economies deeper into recession (Hudson, 2012; Blyth, 
2013b). In the eyes of numerous critics, therefore, Germany has used its newly revealed 
might in ways that have exacerbated rather then contained the centrifugal forces that 
continue to threaten the EU nearly a decade after the US subprime mortgage crisis reached 
its shores (Jones, 2010; Wolf, 2016; Krugman, 2017). 
 
The centrality of the German state to the (mis)management of the eurocrisis has given rise 
to a large body of political commentary and scholarly analysis that has sought to explore 
the forces driving its uncompromising insistence on ‘austerity’. Among the competing 
explanations on offer are liberal pluralist accounts that emphasise party-political and 
electoral pressures (e.g. Oppermann, 2012), constructivist interpretations that see a German 
variety of neoliberalism at work (e.g. Blyth 2013a; 2013b), and Marxist renditions in which 
German crisis managers seek to restructure the eurozone in the interest of German (or 
European) capital (e.g. Lapavitsas et al., 2013). While they identify important factors that 
                                                 
2 The most prominent measures opposed by German officials include proposals to issue joint eurobonds, to grant debt relief or ease loan 
conditionalities for heavily indebted countries, or permit the European Central Bank (ECB) to buy government debt. 
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have informed Germany’s handling of the eurocrisis, I argue below that they cannot fully 
resolve the conundrum of why German policy makers have continued on a path of austerity 
despite the enormous costs and risks associated with this strategy. 
 
Given these limitations, Germany’s domineering and dysfunctional role in the eurocrisis 
appears to be captured most closely by an alternative, realist-inspired interpretation of 
Germany as a ‘geo-economic power’. According to this influential account, Germany is 
engaged in zero-sum competition with its European partners (Rachman, 2010: 185; Kaletsky 
2011; Baru 2012: 47; Blackwill and Harris 2016: 82). By pursuing export surpluses, refusing 
to redress the resulting trade imbalances, and instead forcing Southern deficit countries to 
adjust through austerity, Germany is said to be “applying the methods of commerce within 
a logic of conflict” (Kundnani 2011: 40). The key to unlocking the paradox of Germany’s 
crisis management, following this narrative, is to be found at a higher level of analysis closed 
off to rival approaches: the Hobbesian nature of international politics as ‘anarchy’ which 
pits states against one another in an inescapable struggle which, within the post-Cold War 
West, is said to play out in the economic rather than military sphere (Luttwak, 1990; Baru, 
2012: 49; Blackwill and Harris, 2016: 26). 
 
The purpose of this article is to challenge the explanatory potential of this paradigm. My 
main contention, elaborated in the section below, is that the narrative of Germany as a geo-
economic power is built around an empty theoretical core. While it uses the language of 
realism, it lacks a clear conception of how ‘anarchy’—defined by realists as the absence of a 
higher political authority and the corresponding threat to survival—actually shapes the 
calculus of states in situations where security concerns do not operate or have receded. Short 
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of a compelling, theoretically grounded answer, Germany’s contradictory choice for 
austerity remains unexplained. To solve this empirical puzzle, the second section draws on 
the framework of uneven and combined development (UCD) which recasts the anarchy 
problématique as the co-existence of differentially developed societies that impinge on one 
another in ways that exceed realism’s ‘security dilemma’ in which one state’s gain is 
another’s loss. This heuristic, I argue, is better able to capture the international pressures 
and opportunities confronted by policy elites in advanced capitalist countries which no 
longer pose an immediate existential threat to one another.  
 
Applied to the German case, the third section argues, this lens reveals that Germany’s 
approach to the eurocrisis is conditioned by two processes: in the long run, the fit between 
Germany’s long-standing export orientation and the rise of China and other emerging 
powers changes the significance of the eurozone for the German economy from sales market 
to supply zone; and in the short term, the divergence in national growth rates between the 
US, EU and China exposes Germany to sudden changes in interest rate differentials that 
threaten to disrupt its exports to emerging markets and to deepen eurozone debt beyond 
repayment. While emerging market demand makes austerity an opportunity for German 
elites as it promises to lower the costs of inputs, raise the competitiveness of German 
exports, and support the productivist compromise with organised labour, the imminent 
threat of a US interest rate hike makes such restructuring an urgent necessity. In this way, 
the article concludes, the twofold unevenness at work in the advanced capitalist world—
different structural orientations of national political economies and their asynchronous 
growth cycles—creates lateral pressures that push German elites further down a path of 
austerity than they would otherwise consider viable.  
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Making Sense of German Austerity: The Advent of Geo-Economics? 
 
Given its unparalleled position of influence within an imperilled EU, the drivers and 
motivations behind Germany’s approach to the eurocrisis have been the subject of 
significant scholarly attention. A considerable number of contributions draw on the major 
traditions of thought within International Relations/International Political Economy 
(IR/IPE). Some accounts inspired by liberal pluralism, for instance, have framed their 
investigation in terms of a ‘two-level game’ (Putnam, 1988). From this standpoint, the 
German government’s hardened stance vis-à-vis Europe’s debtor states has been shaped by 
the need to placate hostile public opinion and fierce political opposition from within its own 
ranks (e.g. Oppermann, 2012: 511-513). Party and electoral politics may shed some light on 
why the Merkel government missed an early opportunity to provide swift financial support 
to Greece and arguably nip the crisis in the bud (Jones, 2010). The paradoxical situation this 
has created of burdening the German taxpayer with even larger bailouts tied to ever more 
unrealistic criteria seems more difficult to attribute to these domestic constraints, however. 
It is less clear why the Merkel government should continue to ‘kick the can down the road’ 
across several election cycles—not least because the same government proved able to defy 
similar levels of political opposition on the equally divisive issue of a humanitarian response 
to the Syrian refugee crisis.  
 
Constructivist scholarship, with its emphasis on ideas rather than interests, has honed in on 
the puzzle that austerity has failed and yet continues to be pursued. Scholars working 
within this tradition have argued that German officials are oblivious to the negative 
consequences of their actions because they are trapped in an ‘ordoliberal’ mindset which 
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prescribes painful retrenchment as just atonement for the sins of profligacy and 
indebtedness (Blyth, 2013a, 2013b; Dullien and Guérot, 2012). While constructivist accounts 
mount a serious challenge to existing attempts to explain Germany’s choice for austerity on 
the basis of rational self-interest, the ideational explanation they favour encounters 
significant limitations itself. What is difficult to explain from this perspective is why the 
German variant of neoliberalism should be any more persistent than its Anglo-American 
kin, whose ‘less state, more market’ mantra was trumped in 2008 by a highly unorthodox 
monetary and fiscal crisis response.  
 
Both approaches, to be sure, have considerable merits and deserve closer attention than can 
be afforded within the margins of the paper. What is important here is that while they may 
capture some of the complications of Germany’s crisis management, they have little to say 
about the resurgence of its power that render this country’s ideational idiosyncrasies and 
party-political complexities of such central importance to the fate of the EU. 
 
The Marxist tradition, by contrast, has inspired comprehensive accounts of how the German 
state and ‘its’ capital have established themselves at the core of an asymmetrical Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) that has reinforced Germany’s export competitiveness at the 
expense of it Southern European neighbours (e.g. van der Pijl, Holman and Raviv 2011; 
Stützle 2013). By giving up their national currencies, Germany’s trading partners have lost 
the lever of devaluation to compete with German exports; and by incorporating weaker 
economies, the euro trades lower than the Deutsche Mark (DM) would and thus cheapens 
German exports beyond the eurozone (Lapavitsas and Flassbeck, 2015). Locked into a 
common currency and unable to follow the German path of internal demand and wage 
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repression, the peripheral countries of the EMU have run a persistent trade deficit with 
Germany which many see as the cause of the eurocrisis (Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Pettis, 2013; 
but see Dooley, 2015). 
 
Despite or indeed because of these merits, Marxist accounts confront the opposite problem 
to liberal-pluralist and constructivist scholarship: in light of a grand strategy of 
neoliberalism at home and mercantilism abroad, the short-termism of Germany’s crisis 
managers seems surprising. Given that the EU absorbs half of its exports, doesn’t Germany’s 
resistance to more generous financial support and its insistence on balanced budgets and 
debt brakes sap European demand for its products, and therefore countervail the export-led 
growth strategy attributed to it? Considering, moreover, the devastating impact austerity 
has had on the economies of debtor states and their capacity to service their debt, doesn’t it 
expose the German state to even more liabilities and the serious risk of default? And lastly—
as epitomised in the dramatic standoff over Greece in 2011 and 2015 and the opposition 
from the affected populations as well as within elite policy circles——doesn’t Germany’s 
harsh austerity course threaten the coherence of the EMU from which German capital above 
all is said to have benefitted so much?  
 
Far from rhetorical, these questions point to a peculiarly self-limiting dimension to 
Germany’s approach to the eurocrisis that seems difficult to reconcile with the notion that 
the German state acts in the direct or structurally mediated interest of German exporters 
and their financiers, let alone a European or transatlantic capitalist class. This complication 
has been acknowledged by Marxian scholars themselves, who have castigated the troika’s 
insistence on deep budget cuts in the face of depression as “vindictive madness” 
(Lapavitsas, 2015) and marvelled at “the abysmal ignorance” (Flassbeck, 2016) of Europe’s 
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chief crisis managers. The key puzzle, in other words, is that Germany has pushed the EU 
down a path of austerity that appears dysfunctional not only from a pro-European 
standpoint, but even from the narrow point of view of German political and economic elites 
themselves. 
 
The final endeavour to resolve this conundrum has been inspired by a version of realism 
that predicts a shift from Cold War geopolitics towards a demilitarized, but no less 
rivalrous, era of geo-economics (Luttwak, 1990; Baru, 2012). Second in popularity only to 
the ideological explanation of German crisis management discussed above, the portrayal of 
Germany as “[t]he most powerful present-day example of” a geo-economic power carries 
considerable credibility (Blackwill and Haris, 2016: 86). Given Germany’s lead role in 
imposing austerity on Southern Europe and blocking a range of policy alternatives, the 
concept appears to capture the dramatic volte face of a state long considered to have 
renounced power politics in favour of economic prosperity and to be dedicated 
unconditionally to liberal multilateralism and the European idea (Rosecrance, 1986; Maull, 
1990; Maull, 2013). It also speaks to a profound disillusionment with the liberal vision of an 
open and prosperous world economy and echoes widespread concerns about an emergent 
self-help world (e.g. Wolf, 2007; Rachmann, 2010). Lastly, and most importantly, it seems to 
go further where other approaches have become stuck: rather than search for the 
determinants and contradictions of Germany’s European policy within its political 
landscape, the realm of ideas, or the terrain of class struggle, the geo-economic narrative 
centres on the international arena as the source of Germany’s self-interested and self-
limiting crisis management. 
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Germany, in this specific application of the ‘tragedy of great power politics’ (Mearsheimer, 
2001), is caught between a rock and a hard place. It occupies a position of ‘semi-hegemony’, 
reminiscent of the fateful imbalance introduced into continental European power politics 
after German unification in 1871 (Kundnani 2011; Corn, 2011). Too strong to be just one 
among many, but too weak to rule the continent, Germany lacks the resources and vision 
necessary to offer the sort of benign leadership provided by the United States after 1945 
(Cafruny, 2015). While it can “protect itself from the economic decisions of its neighbors” 
(Leonard, 2015: 4), it cannot offer a comprehensive, let alone sustainable, solution to the 
eurocrisis. A victim of its awkward size and location within the international and European 
order, German policy makers cannot but follow a narrowly self-interested strategy despite 
the significant risks and costs associated with it (Kluth, 2013). The German choice for 
austerity, imperious and unviable though it may be, “reflects the limits of its geo-economic 
power” (Kundnani 2014: 110). 
 
The problem with this interpretation is that even as it leverages the international sphere as 
an explanation for Germany’s behaviour, it fails to specify the underlying mechanism that 
supposedly translates a particular international distribution of power into national policy 
choices. The guiding premise of the realist paradigm is that this motive force is anarchy: the 
absence of a central authority and associated security guarantee that leaves states to their 
own devices, casts their counterparts as potential adversaries, and instils in political 
operators an overriding concern for the distribution rather than the overall size of the 
benefits to be derived from international cooperation. And yet, once made explicit, it 
becomes clear just how dubious the assumption is that an anarchy-induced imperative of 
survival should underlie the zero-sum rationale of Germany’s crisis managers. Even 
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sympathetic critics have raised serious doubts whether the security dilemma—in which 
greater security from some means greater insecurity for others—can be easily extended to 
the economic sphere (Mastanduno and Kapstein, 1999: 14), whether it applies to relations 
among allies (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999: 191), and whether it actually explains zero-sum 
behaviour even where and when it occurs (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999: 26; Kirshner, 2009: 
40).  
 
Thus while the language of geo-economics may provide an apt description of Germany’s 
parochial and paradoxical crisis management, it offers little by way of explanation. 
Transposing inter-state competition from the security to the commercial arena may work at 
a rhetorical level, but without a corresponding theoretical move, it obscures rather than 
illuminates the specific nature of the international pressures that appear to force the hands 
of German state managers. The critical issue is not that states pursue their interests at the 
calculated expense of others and at the risk of self-sabotage, but how and why they are 
compelled to do so. Unless one can anchor the competitive calculus of states in the problem 
of anarchy, the realist prerogative disappears. We are sent back to the domestic level of 
analysis without having solved the puzzle we set out to explain: why it is that German state 
managers have pursued an austerity regime even while its counter-productive effects have 
become more and more apparent. 
 
This article argues that while the international level does indeed hold the missing piece of 
the jigsaw, the geo-economic narrative cannot provide it. In its place, the next section 
employs the framework of uneven and combined development (UCD) to broaden our 
conception of the anarchy problématique beyond the remit of realism. Rather than simply 
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the absence of international authority that realism makes central to its inquiry, it is the 
presence of differently constituted capitalist societies that defines the force field which 
German state managers confront. Germany’s choice for austerity, I argue, is framed by a 
twofold unevenness: its long-standing export orientation that is shifting from Europe 
towards a new generation of late industrialisers, and its precarious position between 
divergent growth cycles in the United States, the EU, and emerging market economies. 
 
From Anarchy to Contemporaneity: Advanced Capitalist Unevenness 
 
Our entry point into the alternative framework outlined above is to follow Justin 
Rosenberg’s invitation to rethink international anarchy in a sociologically enriched way as 
“that dimension of social reality which arises specifically from the co-existence…of more 
than one society” (Rosenberg, 2006: 308). Viewed through the lens of UCD, anarchy is not 
limited to the horizontal fragmentation of political authority that realist scholarship is 
preoccupied with (Rosenberg, 2013: 186). Its problématique is not simply many states but 
different societies at various points of development. With this reformulation, anarchy is given 
a social substance. No longer separated from the domestic realm, anarchy emerges from the 
diverse societies that inhabit the world; and as the sum of their interactions, it enters into 
how each of these societies is constituted and develops over time. In this dialectical view, 
“anarchy is an emergent property of social development, rather than being an extraneous 
condition operating over and against it” (Rosenberg, 2013: 195). 
 
Reintegrating ‘the international’ into the ‘social’ in this way has been an enormously 
productive undertaking. Building on Leon Trotsky’s original insights into the Russian 
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Revolution, it has given rise to a wide range of empirical and conceptual engagements (e.g. 
Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, 2015; Buzan and Lawson, 2015; Matin, 2013).3 The present article 
sets out to extend the basic idea of UCD to a new area: the present-day relations among the 
states within the old North Atlantic core of global capitalism. It therefore asks: what, if any, 
causal significance does this enlarged understanding of anarchy—now defined as both the 
horizontal fragmentation of the world into multiple political units and the developmental 
differences between them—hold in a context of mature capitalist societies that have reached 
similar (end) points in their industrial transformation? Not the predicament that realist 
thought revolves around, it turns out. Having developed into structurally similar, 
capitalistically advanced states, economies and societies, the distinction between early 
industrialisers and relative latecomers that drove great power politics in the nineteenth 
century no longer holds (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 265). And along with the problem of 
catch-up industrialisation famously explored and systematized by Alexander Gerschenkron 
(1962), the specific geopolitical imperative for ruling elites to modernise and innovate in order 
to match the military might of their more advanced rivals has faded into the background. 
Among the advanced capitalist states today, the security dilemma that realists elevate to a 
timeless principle of international relations is no longer the principal causal dynamic to 
which anarchy gives rise. 
 
And yet there still exists what Sidney Pollard (1981: 184-185) called “the differential of 
contemporaneousness”: the presence, at any given point, of other societies which he 
believed shaped not only the individual pathways of late industrialisers but also their 
subsequent development. Gerschenkron’s analysis, in his view, “merely looks backward 
                                                 
3 A full list can be found at <www.unevenandcombined.com>. 
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into each country’s own history, neglecting, except implicitly, its contemporaries at each 
stage” (1981: 187). By contrast, Pollard conceived of a European and wider world economy 
of any one society “being contemporary with others” (1981: 30) as a powerful force reaching 
into the present. While the locus of capitalist late development has shifted from the North 
Atlantic to other regions of the world, Pollard saw that the economies of the old core would 
continue to exert a causal impact on one another. This additional layer of causal 
determination is lost if we only focus on the domestic properties of any one of them in 
isolation from the others. In addition to the class forces, ruling ideas, and governance 
structures of the particular society under investigation, Pollard invites us to think more 
systematically about the ways in which the advanced capitalist countries continue to differ 
from one another even after their industrial revolutions, and how these differences inform 
the strategic remit of policy makers. 
 
To unpack this ‘advanced capitalist unevenness’, two steps are proposed. The first is to trace 
the peculiarities that societies have accumulated along their individual paths towards 
capitalist maturity, and which continue to present distinctive structural constraints and 
complementarities (Bruff, 2015). The first leg of the journey undertaken below therefore asks 
how the historical sequencing of capitalist industrialisation can explain the specific shape of 
the German political economy and illuminate its trajectory in the contemporary global 
political economy. Close attention to the particular circumstances under which German 
capitalism came into being and was re-stabilised after 1945 can help us better understand 
the impact that the massive rise of China and other emerging market economies is having 
on the significance of the eurozone for the German growth model and on the policy 
orientation of its decision-making elites.  
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The second line of investigation into how its advanced capitalist contemporaries condition 
Germany’s crisis response focuses on the recurring economic cycles that characterise their 
development. The search for what causes these periodic fluctuations is ongoing (cf. Sewell, 
2012). What concerns us here is that national and regional waves of boom and bust continue 
to be out of phase even within the advanced capitalist world. Because they differ in 
amplitude, duration and frequency, they create an uneven and ever-changing international 
terrain that economic decision makers have to navigate. We can expect them to formulate 
policy with an eye to the upswings and downturns experienced by other economies and 
their actual and potential spillover effects. In this way, the coexistence of capitalistically 
developed societies—and the difference in the timing, depth and duration of their national 
growth cycles—exerts an influence over policy makers that cannot be reduced to their 
specific domestic situation. Applied to the German case, the final section shows, this second 
vector of unevenness explains why Germany’s crisis managers have felt under pressure to 
impose austerity beyond what would seem comprehensible when considered solely from 
the individual point of view of their state and society.  
Advanced Unevenness Applied: The Anatomy of German Austerity 
 
The analytical promise of the framework sketched out above is that it can throw new light 
on the causes and contradictions of Germany’s crisis management. The principal puzzle, to 
recall, is why German state elites have vehemently insisted on an austerity response and 
stubbornly resisted cooperative and expansionary remedies despite the mounting costs of 
this self-centred strategy. To make sense of this seemingly irrational behaviour, we need to 
investigate “the peculiar nature of the German economy as a centre of advanced, export-
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oriented manufacturing” (Streeck, 2013: 727 fn. 2). And this in turn requires that we go back 
to the moment of its belated but accelerated entrance into the capitalist world market 
(Berghahn, 2006: 41). 
 
Legacies and Trajectories of German Export Dependence 
 
This long-run historical perspective reveals an astonishing continuity in the basic structure 
of German capitalism. Germany’s experience of late industrialisation was bound up with 
foreign trade in ways that survived two depressions and world wars and reverberate 
powerfully in the present (Abelshauser, 2001).  
 
First of all, its industrial take-off was overshadowed by the onset of a global depression of 
primary commodity prices between 1873 and 1896 that ended the complementary 
integration of Prussia as supplier of agricultural inputs into the British-centred world 
market (Stolper, 1940: 63-65). More auspiciously in terms of historical timing, German catch-
up efforts began just as a series of technological innovations was replacing the first-
generation industries that had fuelled Britain’s ascendancy (Allen, 2010: 137; Braun, 1990). 
Aided by its geographical proximity to an agrarian hinterland insulated from Britain’s 
superior competition (Pollard, 1981: 174), the German economy rapidly transformed from 
an intermediary between Britain and the continent’s periphery to a major high-technology 
exporter (Pollard, 1981: 178, 182).  
 
While its time and place oriented the German political economy towards world trade, its 
internal organisation made such outward expansion a necessity. The infamous coalition of 
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‘iron and rye’—forged between Prussia’s agrarian elites who abandoned free trade during 
the agricultural depression and Ruhr industrialists seeking respite from a cyclical 
downturn—limited the scope of the home market. Protection against cheaper grain imports 
which threatened the prosperity and power of the Junker class increased living costs and 
wage pressures and tied labour to the land (Gerschenkron, 1966: 45). Industrial tariffs, 
meanwhile, enabled the newly formed cartels to constrain competition and raise domestic 
prices above world-market levels (Gerschenkron, 1966: 45; Trebilcock, 1981: 71-72). To 
compensate for the lack of internal demand and investment opportunities, German industry 
came to depend for its continued growth upon its success in foreign markets (Kemp, 
1985:108; Abelshauser, 2001: 511; Braun, 1990: 58, 66). And as a way of externalising the 
aggressive oligopoly practices that had hindered development at home, it embarked from 
about 1900 on a government-sanctioned export-dumping offensive that destroyed the 
nascent manufacturing industries of its continental neighbours (Trebilcock, 1981: 73). 
Through specialisation in the new growth sectors—chemical, electrical, optical and high-
precision engineering—Germany reached second place among the world’s leading 
exporters on the eve of the First World War; a position that its product portfolio allowed it 
quickly to recover and maintain for over a century (Stolper, 1940: 52; Lindlar and 
Holtfrerich, 1997: 221). 
 
Summing up, the excessive export orientation that some observers see as trumping 
Germany’s ‘civilian power’ today (Maull, 2013: 20) has roots that reach far back into the 
history of German capitalism. It emerged not only from the particular world market 
pressures and opportunities German industrialisation encountered, but also from the 
strictures and incentives imposed by Germany’s social composition. More than “a simple 
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reflection of Germany’s participation in an international division of labour”, Tom Kemp 
(1981: 116) concluded, “[t]his one-sidedness was, in part, a consequence of the compromises 
which [business] had been obliged to make with the agrarian interest”. It is this combination 
of external and internal conditions which gave German development a powerful outward 
thrust and which set up Germany as the ‘premier provider’ of the capital goods necessary 
for spreading the industrial revolution across continental Europe and elsewhere.  
 
The consistent and growing trade surplus Germany has posted since 1951 (Beck, 2015: 153) 
and the staggering increase in its export ratio since the introduction of the euro (from 26.5% 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1998 to 46% in 2016) are part of this long-run trajectory. 
Uniquely among the advanced industrialised countries, Germany has defied the secular 
decline of its manufacturing base (Vihriälä and Wolff, 2013: 48, 60). And, since the start of 
the twentieth century, it has maintained a remarkably stable share of global merchandise 
trade, while the US share declined steadily after 1945 and Japan’s entered into a long period 
of deceleration in the 1990s. There is, then, every indication to believe that in the present 
world-historical context of the ‘rise of the rest’, German elites will continue along a path of 
external growth. The key difference is that, bound up with a tidal wave of late development, 
this strategy points increasingly beyond Europe.  
 
The phenomenal rise of China as the world’s major manufacturing centre intensifies 
competition over global market shares and exerts enormous pressures to reinforce and 
further internationalise Germany’s export model. But, alongside other large emerging market 
economies, China’s capitalist industrialisation also vastly expands the scale of opportunity. 
Although the EU still absorbs the majority of German exports, emerging markets offer far 
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greater room for expansion given that German manufactures are “almost perfectly suited to 
the needs of rapidly growing economies” (Hübner, 2015: 399; Bartlett and Roller, 2010: 3). 
In comparison, the EU home market is increasingly saturated, with the vast majority of 
German investment going into supplying existing customers rather than producing for new 
markets (DIHK, 2015). The crisis, moreover, has sapped the ability of European markets to 
absorb German exports and increased the importance of other outlets. While Germany’s net 
exports to the eurozone halved between 2007 and 2011, a growing trade surplus with the 
rest of the world more than compensated for this loss (Jannsen and Kooths, 2012: 6-7). 
 
At first blush this long-term trajectory appears to do little more than set the stage for 
commercial rivalries to play out in a global rather than European theatre. To challenge 
rather than confirm the realist image of German geo-economic power, we need to consider 
the novel social purpose that came to infuse the export orientation of the German political 
economy under the postwar hegemony of the United States. Given its specialization in the 
manufacture and export of high-quality capital goods, Germany was central to American 
plans to reconstruct and stabilise the economies of the North Atlantic core through the 
extension of Fordist patterns of mass production and consumption and Keynesian demand 
management. Germany at once benefitted from and stood at one remove from these designs. 
The external demand for its manufactures meant that it could partake in the massive 
postwar boom without, however, fully converting to Fordist and Keynesian principles itself. 
 
Alongside standardized mass production, small and medium-sized enterprises and 
regional economies in particular retained and deepened aspects of ‘diversified quality 
production’ inherited from the Kaiserzeit (Beck, 2015: 219-220; Herrigel, 1996; Abelshauser, 
 19 
2004: 30-34). According to Stefan Beck (2015: 223, 230-231), the focus on specialised goods 
with distinctive non-price advantages and on income-elastic niche markets allowed German 
exporters to raise their profit margins and selectively reward skilled workers with payments 
above the pay scale. Most notably, therefore, in Germany the Fordist ‘virtuous circle’ took a 
detour through the world market. Rather than technology-induced productivity gains 
translating into higher wages that in turn drove up domestic demand, corporate profits, and 
investment, international expansion acted as the chief catalyst for Germany’s recovery 
(Beck, 2015: 161; Shonfield, 1965: 288-289). Only in a second and conditional step were the 
fruits of Germany’s strong export performance passed on to workers, whose productivity 
increases outpaced the growth in labour compensation until the late 1960s. Instead, in 
growth markets where German exporters competed directly via prices rather than superior 
craftsmanship or specialisation, wage moderation was seen as the key to success—not only 
by specific firms or sectors but also by political decision makers (Beck, 2015: 223). By curbing 
wage growth through interest rate raises, Germany’s monetary officials sought to keep 
domestic inflation below the levels of its international competitors, and thus to secure price 
advantages for German firms and their products in global markets (cf. Scharpf, 2015: 92-93; 
Holtfrerich, 2008: 35). 
 
The structurally inherited export orientation of Germany’s economy was elevated by its 
post-fascist elites to a strategic priority (Beck, 2015: 223). The return to the world market was 
seen as vital if the new West German state was to quickly rebuilt and earn the US dollars 
needed to pay for imports, wartime reparations and debt. It also presented a golden 
opportunity as German capital goods were in high demand with the onset of the Korean 
War. Finally, it offered a distinctly ‘non-Keynesian’ route towards a prosperity capitalism 
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that received its main impetus from abroad rather than through wage-led and state-
managed domestic demand. To Germany’s conservative classes, confronted with allied 
denazification directives and pressures for a socialist transformation from below, the 
pursuit of a trade surplus promised to limit state intervention to welfare state compensation 
and to tie material rewards to labour discipline (Cesaratto and Stirati 2010: 73; Becker 2015: 
240). 
 
It is in this particular rather than general mercantilist sense that foreign trade, in the words 
of Ludwig Erhard (quoted in Cesaratto and Stirati, 2010: 73), became “the very core and 
even precondition of our economic and social order”. Rather than power and plenty writ 
large, the pursuit of export-led growth emerged as the preferred strategy of state-building 
and social pacification after the defeat of fascism and the delegitimation of authoritarian 
forms of labour control. Mediated by Marshall planners, the far-reaching demands of trade 
unionists and social democrats for economic democracy, state planning and nationalisation 
were channelled into co-determination laws that recognised workers as stakeholders in the 
performance and management of the firm. Enlisted in a common export drive that promised 
job security, material and social gains in exchange for trade union and work council 
cooperation and, if necessary, concessions, organised labour in the core industries has been 
brought into a system of economic coordination that includes universal banks, large firms, 
state agencies, and research institutes (Esser and Fach with Dyson, 1983: 108).  
 
There is no doubt that this bloc of what scholars have called Germany Inc. has weakened 
significantly over the last three decades of neoliberal globalisation (cf. Streeck 2009). Large 
banks and multinational corporations have internationalised their operations and scaled 
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back their commitment to the German model, while organised labour has been marginalised 
by the welfare state and labour market (the so-called ‘Hartz IV’) reforms introduced by the 
Red-Green coalition in 2002. A key constant, however, has been a common focus on exports, 
both as an accumulation strategy of individual firms and sectors and as a macroeconomic 
target of policy making. For a range of actors, Germany’s trade surpluses continue to be a 
measure of success, routinely reported in the media and defended vigorously by public 
officials against outside criticism (Beck, 2015: 153). The great recession, moreover, has 
forged a form of ‘crisis corporatism’ between employers and workers. Although on less 
favourable terms for labour, this revived corporatism builds on key elements of the 
productivist compromise, including job guarantees in exchange for work time concessions 
and a concentration on international markets (Urban, 2012; Solty, 2016: 39-40). 
 
Far from alive and well, it is precisely the gradual erosion of the German social model that 
defines the challenge confronted by German policy makers in the context of the eurocrisis. 
Tasked to mediate between the diverse and potentially conflicting interests of an 
unravelling Germany Inc., German officials rely on the proven remedy of an export drive. 
And we shall see below that, within definite limits, their choice for austerity within the 
eurozone fits this balancing role as it promises to promote the world market position of 
German capital while keeping privileged segments of organised labour on board.  
 
What is at stake in the debate over the eurocrisis, therefore, is not a timeless struggle for the 
world surplus but, as Luigi Bonatti and Andrea Fracasso (2013) insist, the viability of a 
particular national political economy that has come under considerable strain. This political 
economy is a legacy of Germany’s peculiar insertion in the capitalist world market and 
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reconstruction after 1945. And, as Robert Boyer (2015: 217) sums up, it “can function as long 
as there are waves of industrialisation in new countries that require capital goods made in 
Germany”. Seen in this light, we can begin to understand the long-standing political 
consensus that makes Germany’s incumbent and prospective state managers (with the 
exception of Die Linke, of any party-political affiliation) defend German trade surpluses and 
resist the internal demand stimulation that many observers propose as the only viable 
solution to the structural imbalances that plague the eurozone. 
 
Of course, if Germany is to retain its position as the workshop of a rapidly industrialising 
world, it simply cannot afford to rein in its export prowess (Bonatti and Fracasso, 2013: 
1029). But behind this ostensibly geo-economic calculus of defending Germany’s market 
share in the face of global competitive pressures lies the concern to preserve an 
institutionalised set of industrial relations forged on the basis of Germany’s buoyant export 
economy. A shift towards domestic expansion diminishes not only German export 
performance, but also the underlying class compromise it relies on and is meant to secure. 
Germany’s international competitiveness—based on the suppression of internal demand, 
the containment of wages, and the maintenance of price stability—ultimately requires 
compliant unions and work councils that are willing to moderate their demands. A 
programme of public investment unduly strengthens organised labour and “threatens the 
wage coordination on which exports are based” (Hall, 2015: 55), thus undermining both 
German economic success and social cohesion. 
 
Taking stock of the argument so far, the long-run specialisation in the export of capital goods 
and durable consumer goods, and, starting in the boom years of the 1950s, the accumulation 
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of a consistent trade surplus as a source of domestic stabilisation, present an almost 
insurmountable hurdle for German crisis managers to pursue anything other than an 
export-led recovery in the wake of the global financial crisis (Cesaratto, 2013: 248; Hall, 2012: 
144). The challenges and opportunities posed by the rapid industrialisation of China and 
other emerging economies, meanwhile, offer a major incentive to continue this course. 
 
But this structural fixation on exports as the key to social stability at best explains why 
German policy makers would shirk their responsibilities within the solidarity community 
of the EU despite the plight of the Southern economies. The growing importance of extra-
European markets for the vitality of the German social model (Hübner, 2015: 405), to be 
sure, can explain why German state managers would eschew domestic reflation; but it still 
leaves us wondering why they would insist upon austerity measures that many have 
argued must undermine the eurozone’s ability to absorb German exports (Hudson, 2012: 
314-315). 
 
Situating German crisis management in the longer historical perspective sketched out above 
provides us with a second piece of this puzzle: in as far as the European home market is 
included in this self-centred and globally oriented crisis management strategy, it enters the 
equation not so much as a vital outlet but as a regional production platform for German 
exports. 
 
Much of the scholarly literature has focused on the extension of German manufacturing 
networks from the Benelux countries, northern Italy and Austria to the low-wage economies 
in the former Eastern bloc (Becker, 2015: 238; Bruff, 2015: 117). This spatial reorganisation of 
 24 
industrial activity is by no means limited to the Visegrád countries, however. Germany 
todays stands at the centre of supply chains that link the old EU to the current EU27, whose 
members “export intermediates to other EU15 countries in particular for use in those 
countries’ exports” (de Backer, Miroudot and Ragoussis, 2013: 86). Even within the smaller 
group of euro members, Germany’s role is preponderant: the added value streams into and 
out of Germany make up 28.8% and 23% of the eurozone total (Amador et al., 2015: 12). 
Notwithstanding the growing importance of emerging economies, “most of Germany’s 
foreign inputs are sourced from other EU countries”. In fact, “the share of these inputs 
contributed by EU15 member states is greater than the share contributed by the [Central 
and Eastern European] countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007” (de Backer, Miroudot 
and Ragoussis, 2013: 90). 
 
The lead role of German manufacturers in European and global supply chains has been 
widely credited for their strong export performance despite intensified competition from 
emerging market economies (Gräf et al., 2013: 9; Vihriälä and Wolff, 2013: 68). This is due in 
large part to the ability of German exporters to parcel out and optimise production across 
this new industrial landscape in both East and West. According to an annual survey 
conducted by the Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHK) 
among its members, the 14 old EU countries are becoming an increasingly attractive host of 
foreign direct investment for German manufacturers seeking to cut costs (DIHK, 2015: 3). 
The explanation and in part prescription offered by the DIHK is that the reform efforts 
undertaken by European countries are now more strongly reflected in the investment 
decisions of German manufacturing companies (DIHK 2015: 13). In contrast to their US 
counterparts, however, German corporations tend to relocate only low-skill and labour-
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intensive parts of production, while retaining “company head offices, research and 
development and activities that require highly qualified, highly specialised and well paid 
staff” (Gräf 2013: 12). Rather than extricate themselves completely, they seek to offset the 
rigidities of the German social partnership (Dörrenbächer, 2004; Boyer, 2015: 215). There is, 
in other words, a distinctive complementarity between German foreign investment and 
domestic production that sets Germany apart from its neoliberal peers and illuminates its 
austerity course (Kwon, 2012).  
 
The combination and reduction of unemployment and social benefits under the ‘Hartz IV’ 
reforms of 2002 marks a watershed in the country’s postwar economic history that is widely 
read as the German embrace of neoliberalism (Stützle 2013; Streeck 2009: 62-63). The reforms 
ruptured relations between the governing Red-Green coalition and their social democratic, 
trade unions, and working class constituency. They have led to an enormous increase in 
income inequality and old-age poverty. And the decline in unemployment has coincided 
with an enormous expansion of the part-time and low-wage sector as workers are 
compelled to take on precarious jobs in order to avoid punitive benefit cuts. But while the 
so-called neoliberal turn has shifted the German model from welfare to workfare, it has 
retained a rump of the postwar settlement: manufacturing firms and compliant workers, 
bound together in the pursuit of export success. In fact, Hartz IV in some respects has 
sustained this productivist core. The creation of a pool of temporary low-wage workers has 
allowed German industry to save costs by reducing the number of core employees and to 
respond more flexibly to the ebb and flow of world market demand (Hall, 2015: 48). 
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Thus while the social circle of its beneficiaries has dramatically narrowed, the spatial reach 
of the German model has been significantly extended. Similar to the bifurcation of the 
domestic labour market, the geographical dispersion of low-skill and labour-intensive 
portions of the production process serves as an auxiliary to Germany’s manufacturing sector 
and supports the symbiosis of export success and domestic stabilisation. In this view, the 
privatisation of state assets, compression of wages and restructuring of labour markets that 
German elites have insisted upon most fiercely in exchange for financial assistance to deficit 
countries does make some sense. From the standpoint of capital, these structural reforms 
offer avenues for German manufacturers to ‘nearshore’ and optimise their production 
process. Accordingly, the DIHK report cited above praises Spain for raising the retirement 
age, freezing public sector wages, and increasing the number of workdays while concluding 
that there is further potential for reform especially in France and Italy (2015: 13-14). For 
German business, calls to improve the ‘competitiveness’ of the eurozone are quite patently 
about creating favourable conditions for German investment. And indeed, German firms 
have demonstrated a growing appetite to buy up European companies in the wake of the 
global financial crisis. While the overall volume of cross-border mergers and acquisition 
(M&A) within the eurozone more than halved between 2007 and 2016, Germany’s cross-
border M&A strongly rebounded and is expected to surpass its pre-crisis peak this year. 
Although the figures fluctuate from quarter to quarter, at the end of 2016 its share stood an 
all-time high of 16.5% of all intra-eurozone M&A (Thomson One 2017, my calculations). 
 
The official mind of German crisis management is of course less transparent, and whether 
they share this opportunistic outlook is difficult to demonstrate conclusively. And yet it is 
certainly reflected in the views of some of those providing policy expertise. The Kiel 
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Institute for the World Economy, a prestigious think tank which helped design the 
Maastricht criteria for the euro and which in April 2015 won a bid to advise the European 
Parliament on monetary and economic policy, provides one illuminating example. In a 2012 
study on Germany’s trade performance, two of its lead analysts (Jannsen and Kooths, 2012: 
372) outline a solution to the trade imbalances that plague the eurozone: rather than strike 
out on their own, firms from European deficit countries should integrate into the global 
value chains dominated by German exporters as “a short-cut to target foreign markets that 
would otherwise remain beyond their scope” (Jannsen and Kooths, 2012: 372). The road to 
an economic recovery they outline is premised not only on the centrality of German export 
manufacturing but also on the incorporation of other eurozone economies as intermediate 
suppliers. In this view, measures such as wage and pensions cuts, working time increases, 
and the restriction of job security that German officials have demanded from crisis countries 
advance a particular kind of economic integration. Whether it can actually solve the 
eurocrisis through a German-centred export drive is doubtful. But in as much as this 
structural adjustment reinforces Germany’s world market position and benefits its export-
oriented firms and highly skilled workers, it helps prop up what is left of its social model 
by removing what remains of the postwar settlement elsewhere. 
 
Caught between Cycles 
 
The previous section has argued that German-inspired austerity is in part about 
incorporating other parts of Europe into Germany’s transnational production complex, in 
order to reproduce in a new world-historical context a distinctive political economy 
inherited from Germany’s late industrialisation.  
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Still, we cannot be entirely satisfied. After all, the real paradox of austerity politics is that it 
appears to be self-defeating even from the narrowly instrumentalist point of view of 
German policy makers or businesses. Not only have the mandated budget cuts, labour 
market reforms and privatisation schemes failed to stabilise the financial situation and 
decimated economic output and employment in the targeted countries. The humanitarian 
catastrophe and political fallout also raise the serious risk, manifest at least twice in the last 
six years in the hard line taken against Greece, of forcing a country out of the eurozone and 
undermining the monetary, economic and political foundations of the European Union 
(Baru, 2012: 53). The final and most crucial piece of the puzzle, then, is why German state 
elites continue to vehemently insist upon a path of austerity in a situation that many 
observers decry as defying any rational cost-benefit analysis. The answer, I argue, is to be 
found at a second level of advanced unevenness: the growth differentials that emerge 
between national economies at dissimilar points in their domestic cycles of expansion and 
contraction.  
Mapped onto the terrain of differently timed and pronounced peaks and troughs, the causal 
chain of events presents itself in this light: Europe went into recession later than the United 
States, and, at the outset, Germany seemed to be spared from the repercussions of the 
subprime mortgage crisis. The German economy was affected primarily through the 
financial exposure of its banks. This time lag is significant for understanding why German 
policy makers were reluctant at first to adopt counter-cyclical measures. It was only when 
the critical metric of German exports plummeted by as much as one third between October 
2008 and May 2009 that the German government announced a stimulus package in the form 
of a car scrappage programme and subsidised short-term work. Conversely, once exports 
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rebounded to their pre-crisis levels in the first quarter of 2010, the Germany policy stance 
shifted back to its default preference for fiscal retrenchment. Measured in total exports, the 
German economy recovered its losses at precisely the moment when peripheral eurozone 
countries were hit by the public debt fallout of the financial crisis. The commitment to 
austerity exacted as a condition for bailing out Greece and other eurozone economies has to 
do with this change in economic fortunes (Cesaratto and Stirati, 2010: 69). 
 
The reasons for the G20 summit’s “curious spectacle of the Americans arguing for global 
Keynesianism while the Germans… demanded regional austerity” (Blyth, 2013a: 59), I 
propose, need to be sought primarily in this conjunctural crossover. The issue here is not 
simply that different national economic contexts produce different policy stances. It is rather 
that the difference between divergent but conjoined growth cycles exercises pressures on 
policy elites on top of those emanating from their domestic situation. 
 
The aggressive use of monetary expansion and fiscal stimulus by the United States, 
prompting similar actions from many central banks and states of the advanced capitalist 
and emerging economies, has both enabled the German export economy to free-ride its way 
towards recovery and exacerbated the concerns of its state administrators about the global 
repercussions. They could passively benefit from the stimulus programmes being adopted 
elsewhere while still warning, with some degree of sincerity, that the public debt 
accumulated in this process could become unsustainably high or that the spiral of easy 
money could fuel global inflation, speculative bubbles, or currency wars. The most pressing 
concern, according to an IMF report (2016), is that the ultra-low interest rate environment 
so far sustained by the world’s major central banks threatens the ability of insurance 
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companies and savings banks to cover their future liabilities. And yet the battles over the 
direction of the ECB—which German support above all endows with credibility (Pettis 
2015)—are not simply about these negative consequences. In addition to the societal 
interests opposed to keeping borrowing costs at record lows, Germany’s central bankers 
also face international circumstances they cannot control. As one Bundesbanker recently put 
it, “what happens when a phase of low rates comes to an end also needs to be investigated” 
(Dombret, 2017).   
 
Apart from the struggle over substance, therefore, a critical complication is the question of 
timing. Germany’s export-led recovery banks on continuous demand from other countries. 
But what will happen once the United States, who acts as “the global consumer of last 
resort” (Panitch and Gindin, 2011:15)—and whose extremely accommodating monetary 
policy has had global spillover effects that have so far rewarded German inaction—begins 
seriously to phase out its infusion of liquidity? The fact that the US and UK are undergoing 
a modest recovery has prompted their monetary authorities to begin to roll back their 
infusion of liquidity. The Federal Reserve officially ended its stimulus programme of 
purchasing Treasury and mortgage-backed securities in October 2014. Since December 2015, 
it has raised interest rates in three modest steps. That same year, the ECB only started—in 
the context of a continuing slump and yet against German objections—to launch an 
equivalent programme of quantitative easing. 
 
The worst-case scenario on the minds of German authorities is that the Fed’s departure from 
near-zero interest rates will attract an influx of global capital that could destabilise and drain 
the world economy of liquidity (Belke, 2014: 7). Bundesbank officials have repeatedly 
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cautioned that “one thing is certain: interest rates will rise again at some point” (Dombret, 
2014a) and recited the old slogan that “when the United States sneezes, the world catches a 
cold” (Dombret, 2014b). It is of course difficult to distinguish between the rhetoric cited in 
support of austerity and the actual rationale behind it. German policy makers, after all, also 
routinely invoke different economic policy ‘cultures’ to justify divergent economic 
trajectories and policy preferences. But retired officials raise the same points even more 
explicitly. Axel Weber, the German former frontrunner for head of the ECB who dropped 
out of the race and resigned as Bundesbank president in April 2011 over his isolated 
opposition to ECB bond purchases, has warned explicitly that an ill-timed reversal of US 
monetary accommodation poses enormous problems for a laggard Europe: “Emerging 
markets will not be the only ones to suffer when this trend goes into reverse. A tightening 
in US monetary policy always causes fallout. This time will be no different. In fact, it may 
be worse, since the tightening starts from extremely expansionary territory” (Weber, 2014). 
His conclusion is that the prospects of a Fed rate rise mean that “European policy makers 
need to enact further reforms and need to work on generating dynamics, even harder than 
if U.S. monetary policy were to stay on the same course” (quoted in Riecher, 2013). 
 
While German policy makers are not the only ones to raise the problem of a ‘disorderly exit’ 
(cf. BIS, 2014), their political economy is doubly exposed to its global ramifications. On the 
one hand, its global export dependence renders German capitalism vulnerable to sudden 
capital outflows or spiralling debt servicing costs that could disrupt the rapid and 
potentially overheated economic development of the late industrialising giants—a scenario 
foreshadowed by the emerging market turmoil of May 2013 that followed the news of the 
Fed’s plans to taper back its bond-buying programme (Bruff, 2015:122). On the other hand, 
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as the eurozone’s central economy and one of its largest creditors, Germany has an 
enormous stake in ensuring the sustainability of public and private debt. In the face of 
faltering economic growth, however, the eurozone is finding it impossible to deleverage.  
Between 2007 and 2017, its ratio of total debt to GDP increased by 70 percentage points, 
compared to only 16 and 30 percentage points in the US and UK (Dobbs et al., 2015: 4, my 
calculations). 
 
This growing divergence in the pace of indebtedness raises the question of how to manage 
the service of debt and retain the confidence of investors in the event of a monetary shift. As 
the Bundesbank chief Jens Weidmann (2017) put the point most forcefully, ultra-low interest 
rates have created an “illusion of sustainability” which will dissolve once interest rates rise 
again. The danger is that the ECB might be caught off guard and compelled to reverse its 
overly lax monetary course on which a still stagnant and ever more indebted eurozone 
depends. In view of this scenario, German officials complain that the unorthodox steps 
taken by the ECB since the onset of the crisis simply ‘bought time’ that is being squandered 
(Streeck, 2014; cf. Schäuble, 2015). 
 
The unprecedented nature of these measures means that the precise course of events is 
impossible to foresee. As a rule of thumb, one analyst suggests, “[t]he exact degree of 
disruption depends on…how strong the timing of the tightening process differs across 
central banks” (Belke, 2014: 11). The uncertainty around a unilateral exit by the United 
States, and a heightened sense that time is running out, feeds into the growing ‘resolve’ of 
German policy makers to bear down more heavily on deficit countries even as the political 
and economic costs outweigh the perceivable payoffs. The vehement insistence on fiscal 
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consolidation and structural adjustment, and the growing determination of a faction within 
the German political establishment to exclude unreformable countries from a hardening 
core of the eurozone, can be read as increasingly desperate attempts to prepare against this 
economic fallout. The key point is that ‘advanced unevenness’, understood as divergent 
growth trajectories, adds lateral pressures that propel state managers to travel down the 





This article has sought to provide a more comprehensive and compelling account of 
Germany’s controversial management of the eurocrisis than those currently on offer. Its 
main theoretical target has been the widely influential, realist-inspired depiction of 
Germany as a geo-economic power that is locked into mutually damaging policy conflict 
with its European partners because of its strong but vulnerable position in the international 
arena. This article has argued that this explanation rests on a tenuous analogy with security 
competition that fails to adequately theorise and empirically substantiate the international 
sources of Germany’s self-centred and self-limiting behaviour.  
 
Instead, this article has spelled out the set of determinations in the international sphere that 
emerge not from anarchy in the realist sense but from the developmental differences 
between its constituent parts: states, societies and economies that, while capitalistically 
advanced, continue to differ in both their historical structures and national growth cycles. 
Seen through this lens, the German approach to the eurocrisis appears to be conditioned by 
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two intersecting processes. The first is the ever-deepening export orientation of the German 
economy which can be traced back to its peculiar integration into the world market in the 
late nineteenth century and which continues to be central to the productivist compromise 
struck with organised labour after 1945. I argue that the structural fit between these features 
of the German political economy and social model and the rise of a new generation of 
capitalist late industrialisers in Asia and Latin America tendentially relegates the eurozone 
to a subsidiary role as a regional production centre for German manufacturers. Austerity 
within the eurozone makes sense in as much as the region is seen not as a final outlet but a 
springboard to global markets and insofar as it promises to lower production costs for 
German exporters operating in or sourcing inputs from structurally adjusted economies. At 
the same time, it allows German policy makers to preserve the shrinking core of a uniquely 
export-dependent postwar settlement with privileged segments of skilled workers that 
contribute to and draw material benefits from the international competitiveness of German 
manufacturers.  
 
But what really pushes austerity beyond such a sober cost-benefit analysis is a second 
dimension of advanced unevenness. The divergence between the belated and prolonged 
slump in Europe and the United States as the first to enter and prospectively emerge from 
the crisis raises the risk of an untimely shift in US monetary policy. The resulting global 
interest rate differential could prompt destabilising capital movements from emerging 
markets and curtail German exports to these economies, as well as drive up the costs of 
borrowing to the point of rendering Europe’s public and private debt unsustainable.  
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The point here is not to construe an overarching rationality that explains every twist and 
turn in the ongoing odyssey of the eurocrisis. It is rather to insist that the outlook and 
interests, as well as the biases and blindspots, that characterise the crisis response of German 
state administrators are generated by their country’s changing place in a dynamic world 
economy rather than by the invariant pressures of international anarchy. And while there 
clearly is a place for accounts that investigate the social forces which support austerity or 
the economic ideas that legitimate it, it is these international determinants that render the 
German imposition of austerity not simply a rational if risky choice but an urgent necessity 
which, in the eyes of German officials, seems to be without alternative. 
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